Order No. S / 0906
IN THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT
Old Bailey,
Friday, 23rd September 1993
BEFORE:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLOFELD
- v -
MICHAEL SMITH
_____________
MR D. SPENCER Q.C. (Solicitor General)
MR J. NUTTING and MR J. KELSEY-FRY
appeared on behalf of the prosecution.
MR R. TANSEY Q.C. and MR
G. SUMMERS
appeared on behalf of the defendant.
_____________
Transcript of
the palantype notes of D.L. Sellers
(Official Shorthand
Writers to the Court)
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR. GORDIEVSKY
Friday, 24th September 1993
OLEG GORDIEVSKY, continued
Cross-examined by Mr. Tansey
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, you are trying to be fair and impartial, are
you?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Your opinion is in no way influenced by any matters at all other
than, you say, your experience?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, my opinion is based on my experience, my knowledge and the
knowledge I acquired also in the last eight years as well.
MR TANSEY: How much money have you been paid by the security services
since 1985?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I haven’t been paid any money. I am paid a pension by the
British state.
MR TANSEY: How much do they pay you?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It is a question which I’m not prepared to answer.
MR TANSEY: How much are you being paid?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I regard the question of material order(sic) is not
something which is supposed to belonging to the (inaudible).
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr Tansey I can see the reason for this but I think it may
be invidious for any sum to be mentioned in open court, that anybody’s salary is
mentioned in open court, but I think you are entitled -- I mean, you can
certainly argue that point.
MR TANSEY: My Lord, I want to know ----
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: But I think you would be entitled -- because you are saying
-- you are putting that Mr Gordievsky’s evidence is tainted.
MR TANSEY: My Lord, yes.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: I think therefore you are entitled to ask Mr Gordievsky to
write it down, so that at the moment at any rate it is confidential.
MR TANSEY: My Lord, certainly, if that is acceptable.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: You better ask Mr Gordievsky if it is.
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, will you write it down then.
MR GORDIEVSKY: To write it down, what?
MR TANSEY: Write down the money you receive from the security services of the
state of this country.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: What you are being asked is to write down the amount of your
annual pension or what you get from the security services per year, which at the
moment will be confidential to the people involved in this case.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: I wonder whether the jury might retire.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes, members of the jury, would you mind retiring. There is
a point of law to consider.
(The jury retired from court)
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Wait a second, Mr Gordievsky.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: Might the court sit in camera?
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes, sorry, you will have to go out again gentlemen.
THE CLERK OF THE COURT: The court is now in camera.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: It may be advantageous for it to be dealt with in Mr
Gordievsky’s presence.
MR TANSEY: I want to put my propositions to your Lordship not in his presence so
far as the amount is concerned.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: You would like him to retire for a moment. As to whether Mr
Gordievsky is to be present here or not, what is your view, Mr Solicitor?
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: It is evenly balanced from our point of view. I think it
is probably better that he is not.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: It is probably better, as a matter of law -- if anything
arises that I will have to inform you about before the jury comes back, I will
do so. Would you mind retiring for a moment so that we can discover what is
happening in your absence.
(The witness withdrew)
(Discussion in the absence of the jury and witness)
(The witness returned into court)
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Before the jury come back, I have been asked to rule on how
much of your financial affairs with the
MR GORDIEVSKY: So the message is for me to do what now?
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Would you please, when Mr Tansey asks you the question,
write the figures down. The questions he is going to ask you are ones that have
been discussed, and I have authorised that he can ask a limited number of
questions.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Ah, so I am supposed write ----
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Not at the moment; when the jury come back.
(The jury returned into court)
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Members of the jury, we have gone into camera again for the
next few questions which relate to Mr Gordievsky and his finances.
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, you told us you received a pension. Would you please
write down ----
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: To the nearest thousand pounds.
MR TANSEY: To the nearest thousand pounds.
MR GORDIEVSKY: To the nearest what?
MR TANSEY: Thousand pounds, the figure that you receive.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Per year.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Could you put “A” against that. You may have some other
figures. (To counsel) You may want to look at them. The jury and I will
wait till you have finished and he has written down anything else you want to
ask him.
MR TANSEY: If I see that first .... [The note read £1,500 per month]
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes (Shown to counsel)
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: If I am going to look at it, I do not want to at the moment;
I will wait till you finish your questions.
MR TANSEY: (To the witness) Is that what you have been receiving in the
last three years or so?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it’s what I have been receiving in the last couple of years,
after my escape from the
MR TANSEY: So from 1985?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Have you agreed a fee for giving evidence in this case?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: Have you discussed a fee?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it has not been discussed and I presume I am doing it without
any fee paid for it. I even pay for my own transport from the south of
MR TANSEY: So there has been no discussion about paying you for giving
your evidence?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: Has there been any discussion of an additional fee or additional
money being given to you, having given evidence?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: So is the position this that, so far as your giving evidence in this
case is concerned, no-one has discussed the question of money at all with you?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, the money has not been discussed at all with anybody about
this court proceedings and my participation in it. By the way, returning to your
very first question about my pension, that modest pension which I get, I get it
not from any security services but from the British state, and I can argue and I
can quarrel with any of the security authorities and it will not reflect in any
way on my pension, because it is in the law-based state. It is just the
privilege which I happen to receive.
MR TANSEY: My Lord, at this stage I have no further questions on the
money.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: If you want to raise it again, I think you will have to let
me know how you want to raise it before asking any further questions.
MR TANSEY: My Lord, yes. The position is a figure is written down.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes, let the jury and I see that. (Handed) That
document must remain with the court papers because the only other people who
would be entitled to see it would be a higher court, if this case should ever
get there; but it will be put in an envelope and sealed.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: May I see it before it is sealed.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: So sorry, Mr Solicitor, of course all your team can see it.
(Handed) Right, may we get the public back in now?
MR TANSEY: My Lord, yes.
THE CLERK OF THE COURT: We will now sit in open court.
MR TANSEY: So, Mr Gordievsky, I just put this question to you so that you
understand it: you told the court that in fact you are paid a pension. I am not
going to into the details of it. You are paid a pension by the state.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Have you exaggerated your evidence in order to keep in the good books
of the British state and/or the security services?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Are you asking if I have ----
MR TANSEY: Exaggerated your evidence.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Ah, my ----
MR TANSEY: Your evidence.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Ah, my evidence.
MR TANSEY: That you have exaggerated your evidence.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, in the matter of fact I had -- not only I haven’t
exaggerated the evidence; on the contrary I tried to be as low key and unbiased
as possible in order to remain objective, cool and somehow in the British way
not making emotional or exaggerated points because, if I had and if I were in
the position to play it and to give space for my emotions, my feelings, and my
-- all my thoughts about the evidence, I would have said that I have not the
slightest doubt -- I have personally -- as a former KGB officer, I have not the
slightest doubt that those notes which I have seen yesterday -- they were made
on the dictation -- dictated by a KGB officer to a competent and
well-disciplined KGB agent working well for them.
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, you have shown yourself in the past to be a skilled
liar, have you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I haven’t.
MR TANSEY: Is it not right that from 1972, as I understand it, to 1985 you led a
double life? May I put that clearly: you pretended to all your colleagues in the
KGB that you were loyal to the KGB, and at that time you in fact were betraying
your friends in the KGB; is that not right? You were living a lie for over 13
years, to your colleagues at the time in the KGB.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I am terribly sorry to tell you one thing, your Honour, that in
the Soviet Union until the dissolution and the crumbling and the end of the
communist -- the Soviet Union two years ago, every citizen in the Soviet Union
had to lead a double or treble life, and everybody in that country was, and
particularly in the state institutions, like Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KGB
and in the General Staff, had to lead such a life, telling one thing for himself
or herself, another thing for the spouse, a third thing for the children,
another for the office, a fifth for the party organisations and the sixth for
the KGB. So the people in the
In my case I had a great relief, and I’m so honoured and so thankful to the
British state and generally to the western democratic society, which gave me the
possibility in those 11 years of co-operation, that I was honest and open and
sincere with them, telling them the real things and letting my soul -- relieving
my soul to them, and telling them the real thing about the threat from the East,
about the KGB intrigue against the British state and against the West generally.
But it was not necessary to lead such a sophisticated double life like you imply
because, apart from the interrogation, everyone -- they caught me in
MR TANSEY: Is it correct? Let us look at that a little more carefully. For
example, how often would you meet your let us say MI5 contact in
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: We are in public dealing with those parts of the case
that did not refer to public interest.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: I think if you are talking about how MI5 was effectively
dealing with Mr Gordievsky....
MR TANSEY: I shall leave that. I shall try and put it hopefully in another way.
(To the witness) Most of your life, 1974 to 1985, you were working with
your colleagues, were you not?
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr Tansey, you are making the point, as I understand it, for
Mr Gordievsky to consider -- not at the moment; you may want to come onto it --
not that he was necessarily lying to the British, but he was lying to his
Russian colleagues.
MR TANSEY: Exactly, yes.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Could you make that absolutely clear.
MR TANSEY: I am sorry. Mr Gordievsky, the position is this that I know not what
you were saying in fact to British Intelligence or in fact what you were saying
to your KGB colleagues -- I have no idea -- but the one thing you did not want
to do was to let your KGB colleagues know that you in fact were co-operating
with the British Intelligence; that is right, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: That’s right.
MR TANSEY: And so day in and day out you concealed from them by word and action
what you were actually doing; that is right, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It’s absolutely true that yes, for those 11 years secretly,
clandestinely collaborating with the British service, I had to imply or even to
tell something else to the KGB, it is true, and many -- and millions of Soviet
officials and Soviet citizens leading such a life, they actually forget -- used
to forget and somehow ignore that they were living double and treble life, while
I actually felt it. And when I was in freedom in July 1985, escaping from
Russia, the first thing I said to a very senior British official, who is still
there in Whitehall and can actually confirm it -- the first thing I said to him,
I said, “Now, listen, I am so relieved because from today I don’t have to lead
any double life, or tell or imply something different from what I am and what I
think and what I feel.” It was in 1985, and I still I see no reason, when I risk
my life for the British society, I should lie to the British court of law and to
your honourable members of the jury in the British court of law.
MR TANSEY: No, my question was very simple. You can answer questions very
briefly, Mr Gordievsky, can you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I can answer questions, yes, in the ----
MR TANSEY: You have given interviews on Panorama and answered questions very
briefly. You did not make long speeches. You answered them very briefly, did you
not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: The long speeches have been cut out!!
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, it would be very helpful if you would try and do it in
this court.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Okay, I will try to do it.
MR TANSEY: You did it very easily with the man in your long Panorama interview,
did you not? Your answers were short and to the point. Please do the same with
mine.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: Has my learned friend seen the original takes, or has he
just seen what was put out on public ....?
MR TANSEY: I have the text of the Panorama programme.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: The original?
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Let us get away to from there. (To the witness) If
you can keep your answers short, at least it will mean you will not be in the
witness box so long.
MR TANSEY: From 1972 to 1985, you lived a lie, did you not, with all your
colleagues and friends?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I did in those 11 years. I didn’t live a lie with my British
friends, which was the crucial thing.
MR TANSEY: Most of your life -- was it 1974?
MR GORDIEVSKY: 1974, yes.
MR TANSEY: From 1974 to 1985, you spent most of your time with your KGB
colleagues and other Russians, did you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it was a great burden, yes, if ----
MR TANSEY: It was a great lie as well, day in and day out, was it not, to them?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It was a normal life of a homosovietic, which is well known to
people who read about Russian Soviet Union.
MR TANSEY: But never to a British citizen? You say you were interrogated by the
KGB. For how long were you interrogated?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Five hours.
MR TANSEY: Five hours. Is it right that you said on Panorama that they gave you
drugs?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it’s right.
MR TANSEY: Drugs to make you speak the truth?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Despite all those drugs, you said not one word to them about your
dealings with British Intelligence; is that right?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It’s true.
MR TANSEY: That required some considerable skill to deceive them, did it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Good liar, are you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Pardon me?
MR TANSEY: You were a good liar then.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I used to be a good liar in the defence of the British interests.
MR TANSEY: I suggest -- you see, you said this on Panorama as well, did you not:
“I was psychologically prepared for a KGB interrogation for a long time, because
my brain was programmed in a way for a situation. So even on the drugs I think I
didn’t reveal anything”; is that right?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It’s right.
MR TANSEY: That is the truth?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: You were psychologically prepared to lie?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I am not psychologically prepared to lie against the British
interest or on British soil even.
MR TANSEY: What I suggest Mr Gordievsky is that clearly you do know a fair
amount about the KGB by virtue of your position.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I do.
MR TANSEY: But what I put to you is you are exaggerating the evidence. I think I
have made that clear to you, but just to make that quite clear. I want to ask
you before I deal with that about your motivation for leaving
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it was -- what I was saying: it was the last straw that --
the invasion of
MR TANSEY: Why did you join the KGB in the first place?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I joined in 1962. When I joined the KGB, Mr Khrushchev who was
the predecessor of Gorbachev as a kind of author/architect of the earlier
Perestroika and Glasnost. He was speaking of the democratisation of the -- he
regarded cleansing KGB as instrument of democratisation of Soviet society. As a
young man, immature then, I believed and wanted to believe that it was true. A
few years after joining the KGB, the first point I realised: it was an
impossibility; secondly, even Mr Khrushchev, that fairly liberal leader, had
been removed, and a new Stalinist regime came to power in the
MR TANSEY: Were you not aware of the gulag when you joined?
MR GORDIEVSKY: When I joined the KGB, I was aware the gulag had been destroyed,
and at that time something happened which didn’t happen even under Gorbachev:
commissions(?) of the public, of the general public were permitted into the
jails and camps, while in the -- under the neo-Stalinist -- under Brezhnev, new
gulag was created: (Inaudible) prisoners, one thousand political
prisoners and one thousand prisoners of conscience.
MR TANSEY: Did you take any action to help Mr ‘S’ and Mr Daniel in 1966?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Did you take any action to help them, yes or no?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I can tell you that ----
MR TANSEY: Can you answer it yes or no.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I did. I spoke to Danish communists, trying to explain the
situation to them and to make for them -- the position easier to criticise the
Soviet regime.
MR TANSEY: Did you seek to influence the Russian leadership at all?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Pardon me?
MR TANSEY: Did you, yes or no, seek to influence the Russian leadership?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I did, but if you will continue on that line -- we will
speak about very interesting new matters in the life of the KGB -- then I will
have to tell how I tried -- before I started to collaborate with the West, how I
tried first to influence the Soviet government by KGB report, putting some
undesirable truth about the western -- reaction of the West in the KGB report.
If you want to know, we can discuss it for hours.
MR TANSEY: I want to ask you: did you do anything to help ‘S’ and Daniel in 1966
in
MR GORDIEVSKY: I was posted in
MR TANSEY: Did you take action to help Ginsberg(?) and Gladzkev(?) in 1968?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I didn’t. At that time I didn’t hear about that, but later I
realised; later I learned quite a lot about the dissidents in
MR TANSEY: Did you play any part in 1969 in the formation of the initiative
group for the defence of civil rights in
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I was posted abroad then, yes?
MR TANSEY: In 1970, when Mr Zacrov(?) and Mr Mezhnev wrote to Brezhnev, did you
take any action to assist them, yes or no?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I didn’t. There was one person in the whole Soviet system --
in the whole Soviet system there was the only person who, in the conditions of
brutal persecution, control, indoctrination, dared to resist it was General Pytr
Grigorian(?). As a result he was put in a mad house and kept there for several
years until he lost his health. I am watching all those developments and what it
meant for a KGB officer to openly resist. The dissidents -- I came to the
conclusion the only way for me to resist the system was to clandestinely help
the cause of democracy and freedom in the West and through the West to support
the important cause in Russia.
MR TANSEY: This was happening when you were an active KGB officer from 1966 to
1970. You did nothing, did you?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Even then in my KGB reporting -- I put quite a lot in my reports
to Moscow in order to explain, which of course -- I later realised it was all
futile because in the KGB and central committee undesirable information never
reached the level of the politburo and ----
MR TANSEY: Did you protest when Solzhenitsyn was deported from
MR GORDIEVSKY: Of course I didn’t, because already I was in touch with the
British Intelligence. It was more important for me to help the British state
rather than to participate as intelligence officer, and a person nominally with
a military rank, in open protest. I was involved in much more important things
and much more important things clandestinely with a risk to my own life to help
the British Intelligence service.
MR TANSEY: You see is this what you say about 1966 and
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I didn’t because I was preparing myself to do much more
important and much more essential things for the cause of freedom and democracy.
MR TANSEY: I want to ask you about a few other matters. You did not protest when
Solzhenitsyn was deported? Did you protest at the trial of another dissident
Sharansky, in 1977?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Of course not because I was already having monthly meetings with
the -- where I was able to tell the western intelligence community a great
amount of details about the intrigues of Soviet Union, about its military
build-up and deployment of SS20 missiles in Europe directed against targets in
Britain and other countries.
MR TANSEY: The position is that you never protested any liberal, caring position
at all, did you?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, obviously it’s logical, it’s clear, absolutely logical, when
I was clandestinely working with the British Intelligence organisation, I didn’t
protest. It was the essential thing for the western intelligence community for
me to survive as long as possible.
MR TANSEY: Did you defect not because of liberalism but because you had
something to hide?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I escaped from the
MR TANSEY: Did you defect because you were being blackmailed?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I escaped. I had to escape from the
MR TANSEY: Did you defect because you had been found in a compromising position
in
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: And you were being blackmailed?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: What happened to KGB officers who misbehaved on duty; what happened
to them?
MR GORDIEVSKY: KGB officer who misbehaved on duty, they -- if they were on the
foreign posting, they would be recalled.
MR TANSEY: And?
MR GORDIEVSKY: And get a reprimand by the leadership of the KGB.
MR TANSEY: Tried?
MR GORDIEVSKY: If it is a criminal offence from the point of view of the Soviet
law, some of them would be tried. In the time between 1986 and 1989, a number of
KGB officers who co-operated with the American intelligence services were shot.
MR TANSEY: Is the position that you did not defect because of your love of
liberty and freedom; it was because you were being blackmailed?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I was not blackmailed. I was just accused of being a British
agent, very simple, I was directly accused -- during the interrogation which
took place in May 1985, I was accused by my -- one general and one colonel that
I was a British agent. I knew they knew; they had found out about it, and the
only thing for me was, point one, to save my life if I can and, secondly, to
save the tremendous knowledge which I had in my head and the tremendous
knowledge which already was there in the notes in the possession of the British
intelligence community, which would be passed to America and other members of
the western intelligence community, to the governments and to the presidents,
because if I had been arrested and shot the tremendous knowledge would have been
kept for years and years because nobody would have known about it, and it would
have been lost. So I was saving my life but also I was saving -- escaping with a
tremendous amount of useful information, crucial, vital for the independent
sovereignty, freedom and security of
MR TANSEY: Finished?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: I want to move on.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Pardon me?
MR TANSEY: I want to ask you about tradecraft in general.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, please.
MR TANSEY: It is practised by all sorts of intelligence agencies at all sorts of
organisations; do you agree?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Different practices, did you say?
MR TANSEY: It is practised by all sorts of organisations and activities,
intelligence agencies, people involved in criminal activity, lovers?
MR GORDIEVSKY: The tradecraft and methods of KGB and GRU, two intelligence
organisations of
MR TANSEY: Well, I shall deal with that, but I cannot deal with that in open
court. But what I am going to put to you is this: tradecraft is a universal form
of spycraft, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Not quite, no.
MR TANSEY: In fact, one of the best books about it, giving details, is a
children’s book, and I would like you to look at it please. I want to take you
through it. If I can just assist, it is called the Know How Book of Spycraft,
published by Usborne, and it is described: Know How Books, best value in
non-fiction for children 7-12.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Who wrote it? Are you putting this forward as somebody who
is an expert? How are we to deal with this if there is a dispute about it? Are
you calling the author of this?
MR TANSEY: No, my Lord, I am saying ----
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: The fact that something is published does not make it
authoritative.
MR TANSEY: No, it does not make it authoritative, but what it does show is that
a lot of the material in fact is in here, the public domain; that is the
relevance.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: If that the reason ....
MR TANSEY: Oh, my Lord, yes.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: That is all right.
MR TANSEY: What I propose to do is to give the witness the book and I will refer
him to pages, direct him to certain passages. (Handed)
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Before we get into it, would you hand it to the jury. They
can just look so that they have a brief idea; otherwise it is very difficult to
follow the cross-examination. Do not for heaven’s sake read it through, members
of the jury, or we will be here all day. If I may persuade the two of you
ladies, I think you have seen enough; it is just to get a bird’s eye view, if
you would not mind. The temptation is then to get interested in it. Can I a
brief glance please. (Handed)
MR TANSEY: May I say I have two copies. I could give one to your Lordship and
one to my learned friend.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: No, as far as I am concerned, that is quite sufficient. It
may be - have you had a chance to glance at it?
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: No.
MR TANSEY: We have a copy. Mr Gordievsky, you see it is called the Know How Book
of Spycraft?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Would you turn over to page 2, please. Have you got page 2? At the
bottom you see it has got about this book -- have you got that part there? --
and it reads: “This book is all about keeping secrets. It shows you how to set
up secret meeting places and a secret post office, and how to disguise your
messages. It shows you lots of secret codes and signals.” All right? That is
what the book says, does it not? This is for 7-12 year olds. Mr Gordievsky,
would you answer my question and then look at the page.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Page what?
MR TANSEY: I was reading page 2.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: Then we look at the contents and what it says -- this is page 3 --
carrying secret messages; is that an important part of intelligence, carrying
secret messages?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Spy post office covers a number of matters to which I will refer;
codes, quick codes, part of a spy’s ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Mystery codes, invisible writing?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Hmmm.
MR TANSEY: Dot code messages -- is that part of it -- disguises, yes?
MR GORDIEVSKY: (Nodded)
MR TANSEY: Silent signals? That is what it refers to. So if we turn over then to
page 4, and there the heading is “Carrying Secret Messages”.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: And if you look at the diagrams at the bottom; it shows you how in
fact to write a message on a strip; you see, at the bottom: carrying messages in
false shoe bottoms; is that right?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it is here.
MR TANSEY: Concealing messages inside a pen, at the bottom; pen messages part of
tradecraft?
MR GORDIEVSKY: (Nodded)
MR TANSEY: Then we come to the next page and it is called "The Spy Post Office".
This is what I want to ask you about in particular, Mr Gordievsky.
MR GORDIEVSKY: What page is it?
MR TANSEY: Page 6 at the bottom.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: Now tell us -- just read it out first: “A park is a good place to set
up a secret post office.” Spies often meet or leave messages in parks; do you
agree?
MR GORDIEVSKY: To some extent, of course.
MR TANSEY: It goes on: “... because you can wander or dawdle in a park without
looking too suspicious.” It then goes on: “Most parks have open places where you
can have a good look around to see if you are being followed ..." That is rather
important, is it not, to be able to see if you are being followed, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: As a general statement, it is correct.
MR TANSEY: “... and your meetings with other spies can look very innocent and
accidental”, correct?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: We then go further across and further down the page: “Where spies can
hide messages: for example a crack in the wall”; agreed? Do you see the bottom
of page 6, where you can hide things, the crack in the wall?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it is a great simplification obviously.
MR TANSEY: Yes, and if we go to the left-hand side: messages left in an
umbrella.
MR GORDIEVSKY: First time I hear it.
MR TANSEY: Yes, but you know of -- well, I had better not ask you for
particulars, but messages are concealed in various forms of containers, are they
not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, nowadays. About umbrella, the point is very interesting
because the Bulgarian dissident living in this country was assassinated by the
secret service, Bulgarian in 1978, not too far from here, with the help of a
poisonous umbrella, and the umbrella -- and the poison was brought to
MR TANSEY: “Spy picks up umbrella, takes it home, when he is alone, he unscrews
the handle and finds the message inside.” Such things are common; do you agree?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, umbrella -- I know how the umbrella was used once.
MR TANSEY: You get different types of containers, yes. Then look down the middle
of the page: “The spy sits down on this bench and finds a message stuck under
the bench with a drawing pin.” Is that not the sort of thing that happens?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Oh, yes it happened once in the
MR TANSEY: There is a dead letter box mentioned in a church, mentioned in one of
the well-known novels, is there not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: So that is there; the parks and meeting and surveillance; watching
that you cannot be seen; that is all clearly set out there, is it not? Invisible
writing; is that one of the general tools of intelligence?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Used to be used quite a lot, yes.
MR TANSEY: And if you are being shadowed, being followed, how you try and
conceal things; is that right? Is that what you do?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, identifying the surveillance behind you. Each intelligence
officer is supposed to do it, and the agents are instructed how to do it, or
checked by the KGB whether they are under surveillance.
MR TANSEY: Page 28, silent signals; important part of intelligence, is it not?
“If you and your contact can see each other but cannot speak or get close enough
to pass a message, signal with the silent alphabet shown on the page on the
right.” That is one way but you have silent hand and leg signals, do you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: This is a fantasy, piece of fantasy.
MR TANSEY: No, just a minute; silent hand and leg signals are the ones -- it
gives here: one hand in your pocket, yes; two hands in pockets, no. It is all
there: silent hand and leg signals, is it not, yes?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Not exactly like this, but sometimes identification signals
include elements of it, like I mentioned yesterday.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: Will you stop a moment, Mr Gordievsky. My Lord, questions
about a child’s book -- obviously it would be ridiculous to have them in camera,
but that is just one side of the coin. It appears it is eliciting information
which, if it were asked about direct, we would be dealing with in camera.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes, it is.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: In my submission, we must be consistent in view of the
rulings that have been made.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: I follow that, Mr Solicitor. We are getting perilously
close. Mr Gordievsky, pause in your answer there and, if you remember, take it
up once we go into camera. This is the difficulty: you show him things; it jogs
Mr Gordievsky’s memory and he brings out something that really ....
MR TANSEY: What I am trying to show is that all the tradecraft we know about is
all well in the public domain.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: I certainly got that a few minutes ago.
MR TANSEY: The concern, you see, is that it is not merely in a book for 7-12
year olds, but it is all well set out in novels in this country, so that anybody
can pick up great details about it. (To the witness) Do you read spy
novels at all?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I don’t read spy novels, but I read sometimes memoirs and serious
books on espionage, and it is -- of course it is clear that in the West there
are numerous books about it. I have got an American friend who has got
personally in his own library four thousand books on espionage, four thousand!
MR TANSEY: So it is indicative of how much in the public domain there is about
spycraft or tradecraft.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah, but it does not mean anything because -- I can’t understand
where you are getting, because it has nothing to do with all the stuff we have
discussed here.
MR TANSEY: Do not worry where I am getting; just answer the question.
MR GORDIEVSKY: We can make a comparison with for example medium-range missiles,
Russian and American. There are many principles are very basic but a specialist
will always be able to tell if the SS20s are Russian missiles or American U-boat
based missiles, because the specialists are very -- because there are always a
number of small signs and indicators which tell you what it is, and the American
division of troops, Russian troops – it’s also a military unit but there are
differences and they can be told.
MR TANSEY: Is this a KGB way of trying not to answer questions?
MR GORDIEVSKY: What is your question then, please?
MR TANSEY: Well, if you listen and answer the question, it would make it much
simpler.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah, I can tell you that this book which you showed to me is
just a trivial -- very -- trivialisation of a serious subject, which is the
subject of British security.
MR TANSEY: I have got books here; would you accept this: dead letter boxes are
mentioned in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy by John Le Carre? Would you accept that?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Oh, yes, yes.
MR TANSEY: Would you accept that safety signals ----
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Sorry to interrupt you, Mr Tansey, but I am sure you are
right and I am sure it can be put in evidence, but at the moment Mr Gordievsky
has told us he does not read spy novels. So whether he agrees with what you are
putting does not make it evidence, because he has not read the book. Frankly,
does it matter whether he agrees or not? It is there. On the face of it, it does
not have to be a subject of cross-examination. I mean nobody is going to dispute
it; if it is in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, it is in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy.
MR TANSEY: Yes, well, my Lord, I will not go into the books.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: This is what I mentioned yesterday. Surely a schedule -- if
you want to point out, to emphasise the point to the jury, that plenty of
aspects of tradecraft in either general or specific terms are mentioned in
particular novels ....
MR TANSEY: Yes.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: I think that point is clear to all of us and, if you want to
produce particular novels and particular passages that show it, I am sure it can
be done.
MR TANSEY: My Lord, yes. Mr Gordievsky, I shall put it in this way: the details
of tradecraft are all in the public domain.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, they are.
MR TANSEY: Do you agree it would be very easy for one intelligence agency, if so
minded, to set up a false flag to implicate another; do you agree?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Hypothetically speaking, it’s possible.
MR TANSEY: Do accept -- and do not answer this in case I should not put this
question in open court, but let me put the question -- thousands of spies have
been trained by the West and by the East since the early forties at least?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, that is true, particularly on the eastern side because the
Andropov Institute issues each year three hundred fresh spies, three hundred
every year.
MR TANSEY: Do you accept thousands of non-Russians have learned these tradecraft
skills?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It is true.
MR TANSEY: Do you accept that many of these agents or ex-agents are working for
security companies around the world?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Probably some of them do, yes.
MR TANSEY: So the people therefore who have acquired their skills working for an
agency -- you accept that some of them probably are working for security
companies around the world?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Some former intelligence and security officials do work for
security departments of the western corporations quite often, it is true.
MR TANSEY: Do you accept that industrial espionage is a major activity
world-wide?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Do you accept it is big business?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It is big business for the Russian intelligence services, yes.
MR TANSEY: No, do you accept that companies spy upon companies in the West, on
each other?
MR GORDIEVSKY: As far as I know -- and I often am invited to consult different
corporations, including security departments of the corporations -- fortunately
the espionage between the companies, industrial espionage is much lower than
foreign espionage against British and American companies.
MR TANSEY: Are you aware of recent cases of industrial espionage, for example
one that has hit the headlines only in the last two or three weeks: VW Opel?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: The ones we know about: Virgin and British Airways; are you aware of
that?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I heard about the Volkswagen scandal.
MR TANSEY: Were you aware of two managers in April 1993 convicted of bribing
senior manufacturers of British Petroleum to reveal confidential details about
projects the company was planning in
MR GORDIEVSKY: It may be true; I haven’t heard about it.
MR TANSEY: Are you aware how, in the case of the National Car Parks v.
Europarks, how they planted people on to the staff to become confidential
secretaries, to seize and steal documents; are you aware of that?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: Company against company.
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, but I suppose it may be true.
MR TANSEY: Are you aware of how in a take-over battle with Dixons in 1986,
telephone tapping took place, not by the state but by companies; are you aware
of that?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: Were you aware that, when the Independent was planning its launch of
its Sunday edition, a bug was discovered in the office wiring?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: Were you aware that, in the take-over bid for Laing by PLO(?) in
1990, a bug was found at their headquarters?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: Bugging, is that an intelligence ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it is an obvious expression of intelligence activity, yes.
MR TANSEY: Were you aware that, in 1988 at Plesseys, they had confidential
documents belonging to British Rail; were you aware of that?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: You would accept, would you not, therefore, that many companies spy
upon each other for gain?
MR GORDIEVSKY: For gain.
MR TANSEY: Yes, profit.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, for gain yes, probably it is true -- probably it is true. I
know not a lot about it. What I know, working as a consultant for some of the
corporations, that it is much less professionally organised than it is by the
KGB and GRU, and much fewer people are involved in it and, when they do it, if
they do it, they realise they do something illegal, and they are afraid of it,
and they don’t like it, and they are -- being very western, basic law-abiding
people, they do it without confidence and it is a rare occasion. In the KGB and
GRU, it was a daily professional activity where hundreds and hundreds of very
well-trained officers were involved, after two, three years in the special KGB
or GRU school learning the skills.
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, is it right that James Woolsey is the head of the CIA?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Is it correct that he told the senate select committee: “Some of our
friends and allies are involved in economic intelligence operations against
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes but -- of course I know very well that he was speaking about
the recent developments over the recent months, when I understood from the notes
I have been shown here that we speak about nearly 15 years, recent 15 years of
activities of some supposedly intelligence services.
MR TANSEY: Is it correct that the
MR GORDIEVSKY: I have heard a couple of rumours about it and read a couple of
articles about it, but I know very well the amount of the KGB officers in the
United States, and the amount of the KGB only is more than two hundred, not
including the illegals ----
MR TANSEY: Can you answer the question.
MR GORDIEVSKY: ---- whilst another hundred GRU officers. So the number of the
former Soviet Union officers in the
MR TANSEY: What has that got to do with my simple question? I asked you about
the French intelligence service.
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I can’t speak on behalf of the French Secret Service, of
course.
MR TANSEY: Is it right that the CIA advised firms about going to the Paris Air
Show because of the French Secret Service?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it is very unfortunate, yes.
MR TANSEY: It is very unfortunate that a western ally, friend, was using its
intelligence service to spy on American companies.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I agree with you entirely.
MR TANSEY: Were you aware of a matter known as Ill Wind in the
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: You accept that HRC -- I know not whether you do -- sorry, before I
come to that, do you also know that Israel has in fact used its intelligence
services in this country, spying?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I don’t know anything about it.
MR TANSEY:
MR GORDIEVSKY: It is probably true but the important thing is of course to
remember that the
MR TANSEY: Yes, I asked you ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: No comparison with
MR TANSEY: I am asking you about western countries’ intelligence services
involved in industrial espionage against western companies; you agree that does
take place?
MR GORDIEVSKY: If it takes place, I don’t like it at all, and I think it is
wrong to do such a thing, because the allies are not supposed to spy against
each other, and I know that British does not spy against the allies.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr Tansey, you are prefacing your questions and taking it he
is agreeing. As I understand it, I think Mr Gordievsky has gone no further than
to say it may well be true, but he has no personal knowledge of it.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: If I am misunderstanding the gist of his answers, maybe you
could put it directly.
MR TANSEY: (To the witness) The position is that you have made a great
study of intelligence since you came over here.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Did what?
MR TANSEY: You made a study of intelligence.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Ah, yes. I continue to study the intelligence.
MR TANSEY: In general terms.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, yes.
MR TANSEY: Not peculiar to the KGB but also around
MR GORDIEVSKY: Oh, I learned quite a lot about intelligence in those eight years
after my escape, but mostly it was something under the Soviet angle.
MR TANSEY: Since 1985 of course you have been somewhere other than -- you have
been outside
MR GORDIEVSKY: (Nodded)
MR TANSEY: Of course, you know that the secret services in those countries are
engaged in industrial espionage against the companies in friendly countries?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Of this country?
MR TANSEY: No, in friendly countries.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Ah, in friendly countries. It may be true; at least I read a lot
of articles about the French, yes.
MR TANSEY: Now, GEC is a very prestigious company, is it not; prestigious, very?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I don’t know -- please, I understand the word; I simply do not
know the company.
MR TANSEY: You do not know the company?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I can’t remember what is it.
MR TANSEY: GEC.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Doing what?
MR TANSEY: You have never heard of it?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I might be confusing the abbreviation.
MR TANSEY: General Electric.
MR GORDIEVSKY: General Electric, ah yes, okay.
MR TANSEY: It is a very big company; you did not know that?
MR GORDIEVSKY: You see -- it is a German abbreviation; you speak about the
German company?
MR TANSEY: No, no, no, I am talking about the one in
MR GORDIEVSKY: Ah.
MR TANSEY: And do you know anything at all about HRC in the sense that it is a
very prestigious research centre; do you know that?
MR GORDIEVSKY: There’s no point to ask me about the abbreviations because I
can’t remember the numerous different abbreviations for numerous different
things.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Mr Gordievsky, there is no dispute that Mr Smith, the
accused in this case, was working at HRC, and that is the place he was working.
So there is no confusion between you and counsel, counsel is asking if you know
anything about his place of work.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Now I ...
MR TANSEY: Can I break in -- so far as it is concerned, this is the question I
am coming to: HRC is a very big research centre. Would you agree it is a natural
target for competitor companies to want to get hold of their information and
knowledge?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I can’t either agree or disagrees about it. What I can say: that
on the KGB list there was a number of companies and corporations in
MR TANSEY: What I am putting to you is: any company which is one of the foremost
companies in the country in scientific research -- would you accept that many of
its competitor companies in
MR GORDIEVSKY: I would agree with you that it is an extremely important target
with the KGB and the GRU, yes.
MR TANSEY: You know my question; why do you not answer it?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I can’t answer on behalf of the British companies, of course, but
I know the KGB and GRU quite well.
MR TANSEY: You know industrial espionage in these areas by company against
company is very big, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I don’t think so.
MR TANSEY: You don’t think so?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I don’t think so, no, no. What I know -- it comes from my
opinion -- is it’s much lower scale particularly in the past than the KGB and
GRU espionage.
MR TANSEY: I have put to you a number of cases of industrial espionage in this
country.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, but through my years on the KGB, I know of scientific
espionage of the -- of the KGB in this country -- in 1980 I happened to read the
history of the work of the KGB in the scientific/technological sphere on
MR TANSEY: Will you answer my question.
MR GORDIEVSKY: And so if your question is about western companies, I don’t think
-- I know very little about the western companies, but you mentioned a number of
cases. I agree that -- probably they are all taken from the newspapers, yes.
MR TANSEY: And one of the processes of industrial espionage, company against
company, would involve suborning its employees, would it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: You agree?
MR GORDIEVSKY: You are telling me that, yes.
MR TANSEY: You agree, do you?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It is probably true, yes.
MR TANSEY: Thank you. Are you aware that in November 1992 a former senior
officer of the
MR GORDIEVSKY: Who?
MR TANSEY: Victor Budanov.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Oh really? Its an interesting fact!!
MR TANSEY: I asked did you know that.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I know -- no, I don’t know about this but I know very well those
two KGB officers, very well indeed.
MR TANSEY: Setting up a corporate security consultancy in the
MR GORDIEVSKY: What corporation; where are they now?
MR TANSEY:
MR GORDIEVSKY: Now what company; attached to some company or what?
MR TANSEY: You know him, do you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: What organisation is it?
MR TANSEY: You know him, do you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I know those two persons, yes.
MR TANSEY: Because they interrogated you?
MR GORDIEVSKY: The second chap, yes. Well, the first was organiser of the
service of the illegals, including sending illegals to this country.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Can I have the names again.
MR TANSEY: Uri Drozdov.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Drozdov.
MR TANSEY: Victor Budanov.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Which one was ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: The second, Budanov, was the chap who interrogated me. It was he
who put the drug into my drink. Drozdov was a prototype of the KGB General by
Forsythe.
MR TANSEY: What?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Only external counter-intelligence, not domestic
counter-intelligence.
MR TANSEY: The questions I am now going to put will relate specifically to the
exhibits and therefore, in accordance with your Lordship’s ruling, the court
should go in camera.
THE CLERK OF THE COURT: The court will now sit in camera.
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, what I suggest to you is that the tradecraft in these
exhibits which we have looked at, that tradecraft is common to all intelligence
agencies and others. Do you agree?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Individually, taking elements of the tradecraft, they are common,
but in that combination which I have seen and observed they are very much KGB,
under the KGB or having a KGB stamp on them.
MR TANSEY: I am going to just ask you about the tradecraft and look at
principles involved, please. We really need to have page 273, exhibit 30. You
have got the page?
MR GORDIEVSKY: 200?
MR TANSEY: 273, please. Maybe we will use the typed copy because that might make
it easier.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I have got both here.
MR TANSEY: Now, so far as the tradecraft is concerned, would you please tell us
which if any of these you say is exclusively KGB tradecraft, in other words, so
you understand the point, that the tradecraft we see here is not the tradecraft
of any other intelligence agency. Do you understand?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: For example the CIA or the French. I want you to tell us please: is
there anything here in the tradecraft which is exclusive to the KGB, which we
would not find in the tradecraft of any other intelligence organisation the,
actual tradecraft?
MR GORDIEVSKY: If you ask questions like you do now, it’s no way to argue,
because of course in any intelligence service you will find meeting places,
postponement of the meeting places place, agent meeting place itself and so on.
It is obvious that it will -- you will find it in any other. What I feel here
that -- how it is put here, it is what I recognise, which I have strong and very
distinct feeling of recognition from numerous KGB documents, KGB meeting plans
by the officers before they go to instruct -- to meet the agent and to instruct
him, because I happen to read other books and text books from the other agencies
like CIA for example, and of course I know something about the British
intelligence community, and I have never seen similar combination of elements on
a piece like it is here, because this is combination of -- and the order, how
they put here, it is exactly like in my own and my numerous colleagues’
documents, and I don’t argue with you that the elements of tradecraft -- they
are familiar.
MR TANSEY: Let me make sure -- because this is a most important point in this
case -- let us just look at the typed copy, exhibit 44, page 364. That is the
typed copy on your left-hand side.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I speak about page 273 and exhibit 44 in the top.
MR TANSEY: I am sorry, you are quite right, yes, it is 273 on the right-hand
side.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Now, if we start at the bottom of the page, just tell me please:
“Contact break come 2/3 Wednesday each month”. Would you agree that could be any
intelligence agency in the western world?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I do.
MR TANSEY: The date we have; Horsenden Hill we have. The date “25/9 Horsenden
Hill if not following week”.
MR GORDIEVSKY: It could be anything else, yes, anywhere else; I agree with you,
yes.
MR TANSEY: So in other words that could be any agency.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: Move up one little bit: “vertical line, danger: horizontal line come
next day”.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it can’t be – it’s KGB, it’s always -- generations of
officers have used those. I can exclude really that anyone else would come upon
that combination of “danger” and “come next day”, vertical and horizontal line.
MR TANSEY: Are you saying ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: It’s what I say, what I believe and feel.
MR TANSEY: You say that the vertical line is exclusive to the KGB; is that what
you are saying?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: Oh, sorry.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I am saying that the vertical line saying danger -- it is -- on
the basis of my experience, it is exclusive for the KGB. But it is not about
that I was making my point, my main point about the general feeling of
recognition of the whole little piece altogether. It is just traditional KGB
plan of -- points in the plan of meeting with an agent.
MR TANSEY: Do you accept that vertical lines in fact are referred to in novels?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Vertical line is what -- pardon me?
MR TANSEY: Are referred to in spy novels.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I don’t know about anything about spy novels.
MR TANSEY: Let me assist you. Do you say that that is not published, the
vertical line?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, the vertical line, yes, it is a usual signal, yes.
MR TANSEY: Oh, it is a usual signal? Do you accept that it is well-known?
MR GORDIEVSKY: A circle or a bird or a horizontal line; they are very usual.
They have been making them, signals and signs, both by children and by the
intelligence service, but what I say here: the combination of the two signals,
the vertical line danger and the horizontal line come next day, is very much
KGB, which numerous officers and myself in the past -- that is why I speak about
the recognition feeling.
MR TANSEY: Just look at this book. This is the only book. It is called Spy v.
Spy by Ronald Kessler. It was published in 1988. Have a look, please. I am just
going to read a small part, my Lord. This is the only one I am going to read. I
hope you have the bit: “It is stealing the CIA blind”. I think the learned clerk
has pointed the passage out to you.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: It has got, “Ismaelov read out a schedule of drops and told him how
to signal that he had received his money by leaving a Sunkist orange soda can
near a certain stop sign.” That is the first thing that is well-known, is it
not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I see.
MR TANSEY: Can I just say ----
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Can you read it out before Mr Gordievsky says anything. Then
the jury and I know what you are talking about.
MR TANSEY: “If Ismaelov had to meet with Josie urgently ... to tell him that the
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, you see ----
MR TANSEY: Now ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: You see, it is such a ridiculous really statement: if the
MR TANSEY: Are you deliberately trying to misunderstand?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I understand you very well. You are making point that the
vertical line is a usual signal. I agree with you entirely: both children and
intelligence service use the -- most usually vertical, circle, horizontal and
the bird -- they do it all the time; no need to read such books as this.
MR TANSEY: So anybody could put in -- any intelligence service, any organisation
-- horizontal/vertical line, could they not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Thank you. So that is common, the horizontal/vertical; you get that
in all agencies, do you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Oh, yes, yes, yes.
MR TANSEY: Absolutely, so go further up: “Copy John’s contracts list”.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: That is just saying, “Copy John’s contracts list.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Anybody could say that to anybody. What is special, unique KGB about
“Copy John’s contracts list”? Tell us what is special about it, that makes it
KGB and not any other organisation.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Of course not; anybody can say it; I agree with you. What I was
saying: that seeing the note, the whole context of the note, and particularly
all the four -- how many notes -- in the context of those four notes, then the
pattern is very clear. It is a KGB pattern and, as a former KGB officer, I was
invited here to express my opinion, and my opinion was, as I said it many times
before, I have a strong feeling of recognition. I personally am absolutely sure
it is a KGB -- those are KGB dictated notes.
MR TANSEY: You are a hired gun, are you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: If you say, “Copy John’s contract list”, of course anybody can
say it, though of course I feel very strongly about it, that it was a KGB
requirement to copy it in order to think about the future access.
MR TANSEY: Just tell me this: could not a company spy for another company ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Could, yes.
MR TANSEY: Say, “Copy John’s contract list”?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: That has got nothing do with the KGB.
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it’s not KGB at all; in this case I agree with you.
MR TANSEY: Then “Lou’s Tennis locations” in a park; nothing KGB about that at
all, is there?
MR GORDIEVSKY: If you will see a well-dressed person wearing a tie in Horsenden,
going for a walk in the park, you will also say there is nothing KGB about it.
Meanwhile he’s a lieutenant-colonel of the KGB going there to meet the agent.
MR TANSEY: The man in the smart suit walking there could have nothing do with
the KGB.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, and he may -- but also he may.
MR TANSEY: You might put him down as being an agent.
MR GORDIEVSKY: By the way when -- yesterday I didn’t tell you that in the KGB,
in the KGB main residence, station, room in Kensington Palace Gardens, and in
No. 16 Kensington Palace Gardens, which is the building belonging to the
services, there are two intercept stations listening to the British
communications, including the communications of the surveillance and the police
services in London, in the KGB sub-station and the GRU sub-station in the
building in Highgate. There were two sub-stations of intercept-signal
intelligence, listening to the communications of the British, numerous ministry
communications but particularly easily intercepting the police communications.
And it was interesting that, in that area which was mentioned in those notes and
which we discussed yesterday, there were no other services operating; there was
only KGB which usually -- which operated in that area, parts of London, and
sometimes when the KGB cars, on the way to the meeting places, were caught by
the surveillance -- and it happened -- I remember very well how after two hours
of dry cleaning, no surveillance, suddenly surveillance -- and it was in that
area the KGB intercept stations were able to identify the activities in the air
belonging to that part of London. So of course any company can be there
operating in Horsenden, but in my three years in the KGB station there, neither
the GRU nor KGB had not found and heard any other services apart from the KGB
itself.
MR TANSEY: If you want secret communication, as that little children’s book
said, you look for a good park; is that right? You look for a good hill, and a
good park. Anybody can work that out, can they not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: So there is nothing down there that is exclusive to the KGB, is
there?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, we differ here; I agree.
MR TANSEY: I am saying there is nothing individual that you can say is KGB.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Nothing individual, I agree, yes.
MR TANSEY: So “Lou’s Tennis locations” -- that could be anything.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: “Copy the list” -- that could be anything. The vertical/horizontal --
anyone could do that.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Horsenden Hill -- anyone could go there, anyone.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Of course.
MR TANSEY: If you are looking ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: It is a free country.
MR TANSEY: Everyone is looking for a secret meeting place, a good place to go
possibly, yes?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: So anyone could do it; all it requires is a study of locations or a
knowledge of locations. Anybody could do it.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Hmm.
MR TANSEY: “Contact break” -- common to every organisation, is it not, as you
say?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it is usually for the intelligence services because they
speak about contact and communications and broken contact or communications
because, if it’s just two agencies or two persons, they ring each other and say,
“Let’s meet for lunch”. They will not speak about broken contact. But for the
intelligence services it’s extremely important because they are illegal
organisations; they know very well that they operate illegally in the country.
So if the contact is broken, it ought to be restored and it ought to be restored
with the clandestine means, and it is a problem each time; there is a great
problem how to restore the broken contact.
MR TANSEY: “Contact break 2/3 Wednesday each month” -- that could apply to any
intelligence organisation at all, could it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, any intelligence organisation.
MR TANSEY: Or any ex-intelligence officer employed by a company; it could apply
to them as well, could it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it is -- we can speak about the difference in operational
philosophy between the intelligence service and the security department of the
company. There is a difference.
MR TANSEY: Any ex-security officer or intelligence officer employed by a company
could use this, could he not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Or -- can use it but no need for him to use it.
MR TANSEY: It depends. It depends. For industrial espionage, that has very
serious consequences for companies, does it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Not as serious as it is when you collaborate with a foreign
state. I’m a witness of it because I’m under death sentence, as I told you
before.
MR TANSEY: But you agree, do you not, the last thing a company committing
industrial espionage wants to do is to be caught, correct?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: Let us look at the top: “Parliament Hill Fields, card at changing
room”. Is there anything unique KGB about that?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Anyway, I haven’t expressed any opinion of this bit so there's no
need to discuss it at all.
MR TANSEY: There is nothing at all about this anything to do with the KGB or
anybody that you can think of?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No. I have got my opinion about it.
MR TANSEY: Yes, but it has got Parliament Hill Fields, right? That is a place
where people can meet.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I -- what I said about it, I stick to it, and I’m quite convinced
that I was right. If you have got another opinion, it’s up to you to express it,
of course, and I can.
MR TANSEY: Parliament Hill Field is a place where people can meet.
MR GORDIEVSKY: The best thing to just remain here with different opinions about
it.
MR TANSEY: Because -- well, we have gone through that one and you agree that, as
you look at them item by item, they could be written by any organisation at all.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Taking out of the context, yes, we agree about it, I said from
the start.
MR TANSEY: So let us move on then, please, to the next page,
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Which page are you on now?
MR TANSEY: 274, and that is the next exhibit,
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Would somebody explain to me: on the back of page 273 we
have exhibit 44, and top of 274 we have exhibit 31.
MR TANSEY: Yes.
MR KELSEY-FRY: I can explain.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Which is it?
MR KELSEY-FRY: The handwritten exhibit shows the correct exhibit number. The
reason you have 44 on all the typescript is because one exhibit produced all the
typescripts.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: I see, yes.
MR TANSEY: So page 274 is exhibit JS/42, the typed on the left-hand side.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
30/ MR TANSEY:
MR GORDIEVSKY: Hmm.
MR TANSEY: 2nd/3rd April.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: May I just suggest, Mr Tansey, that I could ask an
individual question because it might save time. (To the witness)
Individually, would you accept that each individual piece of information on this
document, like the previous document, could have been made by anybody?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Your point, as I understand it, is that it is the
combination; you draw attention to -- I am only saying that -- that no doubt
applies to the other two pages you are to see.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Very much so, with some reinforcing small elements like -- very
familiar to me: geographical names familiar from many encounters and events
where the line, scientific/technological line or branch of the KGB -- where it
operated, and I used to see those names there; like reinforcing elements of
those items: biosensors and the high temperature superconductivity and so on.
Those elements reinforce the great context which looks very much for me like a
KGB context, in particular the context of the -- reflecting the work of the
directorate T branch of the first chief directive, scientific and technological.
MR TANSEY: I shall come to that particular exhibit in due course, but let us
stick to this one if we may, please. Please tell us what it is on exhibit JS/42
which in any way you say points out that it is KGB exclusive to any other thing.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Probably it is not hundred per cent KGB exclusive, but there are
a couple of elements even of that little piece, just one individual little
piece, exhibit number 44, and there are still suggestions, hints for me which
make me feel that I do recognise the KGB style, and it is the suggestions of the
route to take; it is the geographical names here, parts of London which used to
be used by the KGB in London, particularly by the technological line; the word
“suggest” so popular by the KGB Russian officers, who didn’t know how to say,
“Why not to do that” and “Why not for you to do this” and numerous fine, very
cultured British ways to express recommendation. Only the Russian officers knew
only one word for politely enough -- polite word for the recommendation,
“suggest”, and they were slightly uncritical agents, making, even writing down
in his piece, “I suggest”, just “I suggest”, exactly putting into the text what
the officer had said to him: “I suggest that you go to Perivale, Sudbury Town”
and so on.
MR TANSEY: Let us leave out the word “suggest”; I shall come back to it. It is
used a fair bit in
MR GORDIEVSKY: Precisely what the KGB is here?
MR TANSEY: Yes just pinpoint, please; tell us what it is there that pinpoints
that this is KGB.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Exactly.
MR GORDIEVSKY: The KGB is here: combination of the recommended place ----
MR TANSEY: Right, hold on.
MR GORDIEVSKY: And please listen to the end of my sentence: it is the
combination of the recommended place, of the recommended route to take, and
transport to take, the contact, fallback contact conditions reminder, and
discussion about the future of the contact, professional future -- all on one
piece, which is a miniature keyword reflection of the KGB plan of the
conversation with the agent. It is extremely typical, extremely typical, the
order of it and all the main points in the plan, just the agent making notes.
MR TANSEY: I suggest to you that is nonsense. Let me just ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: It is you -- you are free to think whatever you wish of course.
MR TANSEY: Let me put this to you: a recommended place to meet -- every
organisation does that; it is not special to the KGB; everybody does it,
correct?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Not -- I wouldn’t say every organisation but another organisation
----
MR TANSEY: For example, a company wanting to arrange a clandestine meeting.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Another organisation might do it.
MR TANSEY: Where you meet is very important. It is very important that you know
where to meet, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: That is set out in all the literature; in every novel you have where
to meet. It is set out: recommended place.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: So a recommended place.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Every intelligence organisation or anybody else recommends places.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Of course if you want to go to a place, it is no good going to
Perivale, if the KGB man might be at Sudbury Town, because that would be a
terrible mistake, would it not, you going to Perivale and the other person going
to
MR GORDIEVSKY: Have you finished this piece?
MR TANSEY: I am asking a question.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Sorry.
MR TANSEY: Would you agree that a KGB man would say to the person, say, “Well, I
suggest that you go to either Perivale or
MR GORDIEVSKY: Why is it useless?
MR TANSEY: What is the point of the KGB man going to Perivale if the person goes
to
MR GORDIEVSKY: The idea behind it is a difference. It’s just small suggestions,
recommendations which route to take to which tube stations, to take the tube and
where from, then walk to the meeting place.
MR TANSEY: What is the point of going to Perivale Station if in fact the KGB man
is at
MR GORDIEVSKY: Ah, we do not know where the KGB man is. He comes there; he is
driven there by the KGB operational driver, being driven for one and a half
hours by dry cleaning against hostile surveillance.
MR TANSEY: Forget the dry cleaning, please; just stick to the question.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: What is the point of putting alternatives? What is the point of it?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Because probably the original thinking of the KGB officer and his
boss -- when they were making together the plan, they had a number of routes and
number of stations where from to approach, and they made an assessment what is
most secure and purposeful route.
MR TANSEY: Why did they not say, “Go to Perivale”?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I don’t know. We do not know that. It would be interesting if the
person who is the author of those notes told us about it. It would be very
interesting to listen; to know the full answer about it, it would be very
interesting.
MR TANSEY: The KGB man would not say, “I'll meet you at that station or maybe
the other one”, would he?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I think it’s a pointless discussion because we do not know what
the thinking was exactly behind it, but it is a general point. It’s a
recommendation for the place and for the route to reach the meeting place; that
is it.
MR TANSEY: Well, I have made the point. I suggest it does not make sense.
Transport, tube stations -- that is in the literature all over the place, is it
not; travel by tube or public transport, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Oh, yes, it is all in the -- all over the place, only in all the
books -- only all those actions were really in the books and never else rather
than in the books (sic), while they were things I talk about on the basis
it was the real things KGB daily operating in London, in the seventies and the
eighties and in the nineties -- actually diminished in size because there was
one who was expelled in 1979, one officer and another in the eighties.
MR TANSEY: Can you not stick to the question. I do not mean to be rude -- if I
am I apologise -- but please stick to the question: going to Perivale -----
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, if you are asking me what is in the books, I haven’t read
those fiction books ----
MR TANSEY: The tube stations, public transport, is set out in books for the CIA,
for the French and for this country. Everybody knows it, do they not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: There are a hundred books in this country published every day.
MR TANSEY: It is all known. Fallback: “If contact lost meet at 12.45” -- you
said I believe that 12.45 is not a KGB time; did you say that yesterday?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I said the KGB liked -- used to like this time very much,
12.45. I wouldn’t argue it’s a usual lunchtime, so it’s pointless to argue. It’s
a normal lunchtime for everybody else, but I know from the papers that it was a
popular KGB time to appoint a meeting.
MR TANSEY: So the contact arrangement is normal for all organisations, is it
not? There is nothing here about the KGB at all, is there?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Maybe not for you.
MR TANSEY: Could you please tell me: if an intelligence service, of
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: ---- and was to use its intelligence tradecraft, could you please
tell us what is here that they would not or could not have written?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Okay.
MR TANSEY: Or the CIA.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I tell you. You ask me to tell you; I tell you. In 1980, I
know very well one specific case in 1980: lieutenant-colonel of the KGB,
Vladimir Vedrov, got in touch with the French intelligence and started to work
clandestinely for them. In the 11 years of the collaboration with the French, he
provided thousands and thousands -- several thousands -- of documents, extremely
important, which
MR TANSEY: You say 12.45 is a KGB time, do you?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It was a popular time with the KGB, yes, that is what I said. It
is -- the time was very popular to appoint meetings.
MR TANSEY: Can you explain why, if that is the case, you made no mention of that
in your statement?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, which one, about what?
MR TANSEY: You made a statement ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: ---- dealing with these exhibits, on 10th December 92.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I made a statement to the police; that is true.
MR TANSEY: And you were referring to this exhibit here -- my Lord, it is page
177. Does he have the statement there?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Page what?
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: There is no reason why it should not be handed if my
friend wants. This does not have a page number on it.
MR TANSEY: It is page 2 at the top.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: It starts at the top, “I have never visited Horsenden Hill”.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: Have you got that page?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I remember that statement.
MR TANSEY: No, no, no. Just make sure you have got the page.
MR GORDIEVSKY:
MR TANSEY: It has got page 2 at the top of mine and page 177 at the bottom. Does
that help you or not? At the top of the page the writing is -- it starts, “I
have never visited Horsenden Hill.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah, I see.
MR TANSEY: That is the page I want to ask you about.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, “I have never visited Horsenden Hill.”
MR TANSEY: I am going to ask you about that. I want to deal with this question
about JS/42, and you have told us today that 12.45 was a typical time for a KGB
meet; is that right?
MR GORDIEVSKY: A popular time for the KGB to meet.
MR TANSEY: A what?
MR GORDIEVSKY: A popular time.
MR TANSEY: Can you please look at your statement.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: And tell us: is there a word about 12.45 being a popular time for the
KGB?
MR GORDIEVSKY: In my statement?
MR TANSEY: In your statement.
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, there is no such a word in my statement. I was not able to
put everything in my statement.
MR TANSEY: You seriously say that, when you looked at this document here, you
were unable to say this sentence: “12.45 is a popular time at which a KGB
officer has a meeting”? Are you honestly telling this court that you could not
or did not have time to put that in?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, because it is a minor point. I don’t feel strongly about it.
I mentioned yesterday but it is -- you can -- it is not -- I don’t pay a lot of
importance to it. It is -- of course it is a popular time with the KGB. Numerous
KGB lunches with their contacts would start at quarter -- there was another
significance why it was quarter to one, because the contact would supposed to be
somewhere at quarter to one and some other place at one exactly. But it is not
the most important point at all. I don’t know what are you getting at about this
time.
MR TANSEY: What I am asking is: you have dealt in detail with this exhibit. You
have said not a word about 12.45 being a KGB popular meeting time, and I am
asking you why that was.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Because I don’t feel strongly about it. I know that it is not a
very forceful element at all.
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, it is not a case that you are just adding to and
embellishing your evidence as you go along, and you have just put it in, just to
beef up your case?
MR GORDIEVSKY: My -- your Honour, when I was asked to be here, I was told that I
was not supposed to use my statement, the text of it. I was supposed to just
speak from my brain. So in a way it was just to tell what really is my expertise
and my feeling; and so I came here not like a parrot, to repeat, to learn by
heart my statement, and then just to repeat it here standing in the court of
law. I came here as a living man to express my opinion as a person reacting and
responding to the questions of the court. So I’m not repeating every line of my
statement. Of course I can make -- there can be discrepancies between some of
what I’m saying now or said yesterday and the text of the statement made by the
police nearly a year ago; of course it can be; of course it can be. I don’t know
see the point of it. So what?
MR TANSEY: Because you went through JS/42 in some detail in your statement, did
you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I did.
MR TANSEY: And you considered it line by line, did you not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I did.
MR TANSEY: But when it came to this 12.45 ---
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: ---- there is not a word in your statement, is there? What I am
asking you is: do you make things up as you go along in order to beef up your
account?
MR GORDIEVSKY: To be what; to do what?
MR TANSEY: In order to increase the evidence in this case against him, against
this defendant, that you make it up; you add to it; do you understand?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it is exactly what I said just a few seconds before, that I
am a living person reacting to the audience and to the proceedings and the
events around me, and I’m not supposed to repeat the text which I should have
learned by heart. I am just telling what I feel just about now, and I think that
the people and the jury is likely to believe me more.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: This is the danger of asking the same question twice: you
get the same answer twice, and that does prolong the proceedings.
MR TANSEY: (To the witness) If you thought that 12.45 was a popular KGB
meeting time, I suggest you would have put it in your statement when you dealt
with this exhibit JS/42; do you understand?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I do.
MR TANSEY: I suggest that you have not done it. It is not in your statement, and
the reason it is not in your statement is because you keep on adding, you want
to add to prove your point irrespective of the truth.
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it is not true. I have great respect for truth and, if I add
something which I feel just about now, it means that it just occurs to me. But
analysing the text of the statement or the text of what I said yesterday, of
course, can tell you what is the strongest point, what is the weakest point,
what I feel strongly about, what I don’t feel very strongly about.
MR TANSEY: I suggest to you that in this document here there is not one matter
which you can say is exclusive to the KGB, not one matter at all.
MR GORDIEVSKY: From your point of view, yes, and from my point of view, it’s a
most striking reflected – it’s the most striking -- reflecting KGB thinking and
running an agent, and I said it now three times at least.
MR TANSEY: I am going to ask you that again: most striking: you said the most
striking document, KGB?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Probably, yes.
MR TANSEY: Writing down
MR GORDIEVSKY: I don’t speak about the individual elements. It is in all, in the
full context of it, and I said it already three times before. If you wish me to
say it for the fourth time, I can tell you. The number of four/five elements in
a very short piece: there is geographical names; there is dates; recommendation
where to go; there is future, professional future; fallback contacts; the word
suggest, suggest and so on. That all gives me a very good context of a KGB
dictated document. It is my opinion -- it is my expertise. You are free to
believe it or not.
MR TANSEY: And I suggest to you that every bit of this I could pick out of a spy
novel and write it down, every bit of it.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, the intelligence activities of the KGB and the intelligence
activities of the -- of
MR TANSEY: Exactly, so everybody who wants to can pick it up and learn it.
MR GORDIEVSKY: The books reflect the real life, not the other way round.
MR TANSEY: Let us look again at the next exhibit, exhibit 44 page 275 -- sorry
exhibit 32, page 275, typed copy on the left-hand side. Please tell us which
part of this here is exclusively KGB.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I was -- in my statement yesterday I was not talking about any
part of this little piece as exclusively KGB. It was -- I really don’t
understand the whole ----
MR TANSEY: Do not worry about understanding it; just answer the question,
please.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Okay, there is no element in this which is exclusive to the KGB.
MR TANSEY: Would you agree that the agent of any secret service or ex-agent
employed by a company could in fact have written this?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, possibly.
MR TANSEY: Thank you. The left-hand side exhibit 33, page 276 -- left-hand side
as we come down, is there anything exclusive KGB?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it is exclusive to the KGB, because it is the area, the area
MR TANSEY: Is that not an area ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Is it what?
MR TANSEY: Is that not an area ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: ---- which is well monitored by MI5.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I presume it is. Well -- or in the periods of time used to be
well monitored by MI5, yes.
MR TANSEY: When I say well monitored, watching carefully for such things?
MR GORDIEVSKY: They didn’t know what for, which things to look, because they
didn’t know that it was -- the area was used for signals. There was no -- until
I appeared there on their scene, they simply didn’t know that that area was used
for ----
MR TANSEY: Can I go -- in 1985 you say they knew it?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, in 1985 -- oh, yes, they knew it, oh, yes.
MR TANSEY: From then on they monitored it and surveyed it very carefully.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I’m not sure because after 1985 they -- the British security
service was more -- its resources went to terrorists and it had very few
resources left to monitor spies. So many things the spies were able to do,
particularly those more -- such as was so easy to hide, like making signals or
reading signals -- it remained unobserved.
MR TANSEY: Are you saying then -- let me understand this -- are you saying that,
in 1985, MI5 did not have the resources to monitor?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I’m sure that they -- the resources, the British resources of the
British police forces and the British security service, are very limited. They
all use the taxpayers’ money, and they have to spend the money very very
rationally. There are about at least ten spies living in
MR TANSEY: The use of their putting coke cans at bollards ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: ---- that sort of thing.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: That is well-known signalling, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it was not well-known signalling because the well-known
signalling is that one puts with the chalk -- it can be pink like you mentioned
before but usually just white -- a circle, or a line, but the disposable items,
they of course -- they were developed by the KGB in the seventies, but they
started to be used quite frequently first here in the eighties, and the services
knew quite little about it, I think.
MR TANSEY: So in 1990, did the MI5 know about this sort of thing, coke cans?
MR GORDIEVSKY: In 1990, yes, it did, yes.
MR TANSEY: So therefore they were well able to pick up signals and that sort of
material?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah, and what; pardon me?
MR TANSEY: That sort of material, the signals, this sort of material?
MR GORDIEVSKY: They knew theoretically about it but it didn’t help at all
because, when you drive along, you will see a lot of rubbish on the streets, in
the streets. You will not know what is a signal and what is just a piece of
litter.
MR TANSEY: This form of ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: That is why they were invented actually.
MR TANSEY: This form of signalling is well documented in novels, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It’s possible. I haven’t seen it but it is quite possible
probably now.
MR TANSEY: Nothing unique about this to the KGB; well-known to many intelligence
organisations the use of coke cans, 7-ups, orange peel, all that sort of thing?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Oh, yes.
MR TANSEY: Well documented in novels.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Piece of an apple -- and yet each intelligence organisation has
got its own pattern of graphical signals, disposable items, short wave radio
communication and numerous other things. Each service has got its own pattern
and it is the for the expert to find and make a conclusion what party it
represents.
MR TANSEY: Was the KGB using radios, wave band ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: In some cases, yes, of course.
MR TANSEY: In
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I don’t. I don’t want to speak about other cases which can
have some operational significance still now.
MR TANSEY: Are you not aware of it being used over here?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, the radio communication I mentioned to you, that of course
within the KGB stations, a lot of radio equipment, electronic equipment was
used, and two kinds of it because, when I spoke about two stations in the
Kensington Palace Gardens and two stations in Highgate, they had two kinds of
tasks: one to monitor the communications of the police and surveillance
services, and another task to intercept fax and teletype communications between
important agencies or companies.
MR TANSEY: Did agents have radio transmitters in the eighties?
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: I think Mr Gordievsky is saying that he is somewhat
reluctant -- it may have implications with other matters. I am not certain it is
relevant directly.
MR TANSEY: It is relevant to one matter, if I may just put the question.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Well ....
MR TANSEY: My Lord, we are in camera.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: We may be in camera but, if there may still be public
interest, just like something which is written down, even though we may be in
camera there may be aspects one wants to be extremely careful about.
MR TANSEY: Well ....
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: It is ten to one. Let us go on to something else at the
moment. You can address me at five past two in the absence of the jury if you
want to continue.
MR TANSEY: May I put this question?
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Yes. Do not answer this, Mr Gordievsky, until I have
considered it.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Thank you.
MR TANSEY: Were radio transmitters used by the KGB in the
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Well, he has already said they were, as I understand it, but
your question was a different one, which I think you wanted to pursue, which is
were radio transmissions used to be in contact with their agents, not generally
to get information. That is the area that at the moment I am not certain is
actually relevant to anything in this case.
MR TANSEY: My Lord, in my submission it is relevant.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Or may be relevant. I will hear you at five past two.
MR TANSEY: Yes. -- (To the witness) Now moving over to the second side of
exhibit 70 -- do you have the original there, sorry?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes I have got the photocopy of it.
MR TANSEY: Can I have the original.
MR TANSEY: Sorry can I have it please not the witness (Handed).
MR TANSEY: I want to ask you about what it has here: biosensors,
micro-machining, micron valve, HTSC.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Are you aware that much of this is modern complex technology; is that
right? I am sure you are but I put the question.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I am aware that it is part of the modern technology, yes.
MR TANSEY: And do you accept that many of GEC’s opponent companies would like to
know how well-developed GEC is in its research and development?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It is not for me to answer because I have no idea about it, but
what I know for sure is that those components were mentioned several times in
numerous KGB requirements arriving from the directorate T of the chief
directorate to the KGB station in
MR TANSEY: What I am asking you about here is that this here could well be a
request from a competing company.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Or it could be anything, but what I know for sure: that it has --
those names have been mentioned on the KGB requirements many times.
MR TANSEY: But it is hi-tech -- well, I put the point: highly complex modern
technology costs a vast amount of money and many other companies would like to
get their hands on HRC’s material, documents, research and plans?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: It is a prime target for opposing companies, is it not?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, but the difference is that for the companies it was always a
problem, a problem of profit and competition. At that time Soviet Union -- it
was -- as they thought, the armed forces and the political leadership of the
MR TANSEY: Mr Gordievsky, what I suggest to you is that what you have seen here
in these exhibits has nothing in them which is unique to the KGB at all. I think
I have made that point to you already -- this is just summarising the position,
that all the techniques mentioned there are common to every intelligence agency
in the West and used by them, including the CIA; do you agree?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I don’t agree with you, because I have seen elements, a few
elements of that tradecraft used by different agencies, but I have seen a
tremendous difference in the combination of the elements of the tradecraft by
the services like the British, the American CIA, the French, which I mentioned
before, and then the KGB; and here I see a very firm pattern of the KGB.
MR TANSEY: Tell us, please. Go back to 275, exhibit JS/43. In what way do any of
those lines there differ from that of the CIA?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I can’t -- I see your point very well because ----
MR TANSEY: Do not bother about seeing my point. I am asking you ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, and this is my answer. My answer is that -- you quoted from
my statement and the statements on your desk -- in the statement it is very
clear that this piece, just this piece occupied the most modest place in my
statement, because this piece is very difficult to decode and to interpret and
to transcribe. That is why it is a difficult example to -- it is only can be
seen (sic) in the context of all other different, other four pieces.
MR TANSEY: This one here, this exhibit 32, JS/43, that could well be written by
anybody of any company throughout the world?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I agree.
MR TANSEY: Nothing in itself to do with the KGB at all?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: You agree.
MR GORDIEVSKY: I agree about exhibit number 32, translation or transcript
exhibit 44.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Right, members of the jury, ten past two for you, five past
two for the rest of us, please.
(Luncheon Adjournment)
OLEG GORDIEVSKY, continued
Further cross-examined by Mr Tansey
MR TANSEY: May it please your Lordship, Mr Gordievsky, you said that the person
who wrote these notes was a well-disciplined person; is that right?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Who listens, follows and takes instructions from the KGB officer?
MR GORDIEVSKY: It seems so, yes.
MR TANSEY: One of the most important things -- so the sort of person who listens
carefully and follows what he is told?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: The one thing that a KGB officer would tell the agent would be: “Get
rid of these notes.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: “Don't keep them.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, he was supposed to say so, but we actually – I’m not in a
position to claim or to state whether he has done so, because even those
excellent KGB officers whom I mentioned, members of that branch responsible for
technology and science, they hesitate sometimes telling such things to the
gentlemen, either not wanting to frighten them or not wanting to risk that the
agent forgets everything and will not turn up to the next meeting. So it is one
possibility. The second possibility of course that he said so, but the agent,
who was well-disciplined and -- well-disciplined and well-organised -- in small
things and short-term things, was not well-disciplined in long term thinking
somehow, where the hope prevailed over the common sense and caution.
MR TANSEY: So let us follow that through slowly. Firstly, it is elementary that
a KGB officer would say to the person: “Get rid of the notes.” That is, you
would agree, elementary basic KGB attitude?
MR GORDIEVSKY: The elementary basic KGB attitude is, yes, that of caution:
“Please don’t keep anything incriminating at home.”
MR TANSEY: Yes, “Get rid of it.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: “Get rid of it”, yes, it’s true, but it is only half of the
question.
MR TANSEY: Yes. You say, “Get rid of it; memorise it first.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: “And then get rid of it.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: And that is pretty basic and elementary.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: You would expect, would you not, therefore a well-disciplined agent
-- on that basis you would expect a well-disciplined agent on your account ----
MR TANSEY: ---- to get rid of the notes.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, I would expect that the well-disciplined agent, any agent,
particularly a well-disciplined one, would get rid of the notes and other
incriminating material, but in the real life it was different. Why was it
different? Because the same KGB officer who was instructing the agent to get rid
of the incriminating material, particularly the notes, he probably at the same
meeting was persuading the agent to accept secret writing material, short-wave
communication radio, to send signals instead of making graphic signals or maybe
a camera, a little tiny camera, to use to make -- so the officer would realise
how contradictory his instructions are. On one hand he is telling “Destroy all
of the incriminating material”; on the other hand, according to his instructions
from the centre, he’s persuading the agent to acquire from him a lot of other
incriminating material. In the same way the officer, as well listening to the
instructions to destroy all notes, he’s also being persuaded to accept the
secret writing material in order to send some of the notes to him directly by
post, and the agents often said, “All right, I better do something else. I will
not accept the secret writing and the secret cameras, and those notes -- they
are so insignificant, so inconspicuous, nobody would be able to ever read my
handwriting. I will rather keep them because it will be my guide for the next
month.” It is what happens quite a lot in real life.
MR TANSEY: The KGB officer says, “Don’t be silly; get rid of them so nothing
wrong can take place.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: He’s supposed to say so but there are officers who are cowardly,
who don’t -- who hate to frighten the agent. Maybe they say it and the agent
does not destroy it.
MR TANSEY: You are not suggesting he would be frightened to say to him,
“Memorise it and get rid of it; it’s the best thing to do; solves all problems.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah, maybe he said it, maybe not. People, humans do commit human
errors.
MR TANSEY: Yes, to actually keep together a series of these here; that is not
someone following KGB officers is it?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, yes, but you just recently -- only a few weeks ago you saw
on television how the Crowders kept in their walls, in their house in the
suburban area of London, a lot of espionage paraphernalia, things to read the
microdots and radio communications and so on. They were well-trained, illegal
agents of the KGB, the famous Crowders. They kept it. Also when the much lower
grade agent keeps small notes about the next meeting, it is probably regarded --
was regarded by the agent and by the KGB as a kind of a minor drawback.
MR TANSEY: Minor?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah, mistakenly, I agree with you -- great mistake, I agree with
you. It was a mistake by both of them, and the history of the intelligence
service is full of those mistakes.
MR TANSEY: If they wanted him to continue to be an agent ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: It was important that he was not discovered.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes.
MR TANSEY: Therefore it was elementary ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: ---- to remind the person, “Don’t keep anything.”
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yeah.
MR TANSEY: That is what a KGB officer would say.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, yes, in the KGB external branch -- the KGB external branch,
before they stated partial deduction a year ago, they had 16,000 officers, 2,000
of them rotating, were staying abroad. You can’t expect that all those officers
are well-organised, well-disciplined and very methodical and teutonic,
instructing, doing everything properly and instructing contacts properly.
MR TANSEY: It is the first instruction you give: “Get rid; don’t keep” --
nothing to do with experience -- first elementary instruction from a KGB
officer, if it was a KGB officer.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, we do not know about other instructions. Maybe hundreds of
them have been destroyed properly and maybe a few, four, the least significant
ones happen to remain there. How many instructions have been destroyed we do not
know. This is an interesting question.
MR TANSEY: So the position is then, if he had been following KGB instructions,
he would have got rid of them.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, if everything is taking(sic) according to the books,
to the text books, yes, the agent is supposed to destroy them, and that is why
-- the fact that many people, many agents, both those agents of the western --
in the Soviet Union and even more KGB agents in the West have been able -- the
prosecution was able to achieve a sentence, a punishment because they were not
very thorough in destroying all the evidence, because it is very difficult in
the real life.
MR TANSEY: I am going to move onto exhibit 29, 272 at the bottom.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Is that -- which book?
MR TANSEY: Sorry, it is in the blue folder, 272.
MR JUSTICE BLOFELD: Just before the ----
MR GORDIEVSKY: 272, yes.
MR TANSEY: That letter could have been written by anyone, any organisation, any
intelligence security organisation or any ex-agent employed by a company.
MR GORDIEVSKY: Yes, it’s possible.
MR TANSEY: Thank you.
MR GORDIEVSKY: But there is a lot of -- something which tells me that it is a
KGB one.
MR TANSEY: Well, I suggest you are quite wrong and I am into moving on. Have you
spoken to anybody about the evidence in the case before you came to court this
morning, about the evidence that had been given yesterday?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No.
MR TANSEY: Think carefully: has anybody told you about the evidence that was
given in this court yesterday in your absence?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, nobody told me anything. What, who is ----
MR TANSEY: Has any person told you about any of the evidence given in court
yesterday?
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, no, no. I am not supposed to talk about such things.
MR TANSEY: You are not. What was the number of the bus stop you gave this
morning?
MR GORDIEVSKY: Number bus stop? I can’t remember because it was -- I mentioned a
bus stop at random, at random. I can’t remember what number it was.
MR TANSEY: Let me just put this to you: bus number 6 stop on the Square da
Liberdade. Who told you that, Mr Gordievsky?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I don’t know. It was at random, entirely at random.
MR TANSEY: You are not telling the truth.
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, I’m sure I'm telling the truth.
MR TANSEY: You are saying that, out of all the numbers available in buses you
happened to choose bus number 6? You are not telling the truth.
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, it is -- I use bus number 6 where I live several times a
week. It’s probably what I -- why I did it.
MR TANSEY: It is just coincidence, is it, that you got bus number 6 that we have
been talking about in court yesterday, just coincidence?
MR GORDIEVSKY: I have got no idea what has been said in the court yesterday in
my absence.
MR TANSEY: I suggest someone has been talking to you and told you about number
6.
MR GORDIEVSKY: No, no, it’s – it’s probably against the rules but also it was
not ----
MR TANSEY: It is against the rules. Do you care about them?
MR GORDIEVSKY: And it is important for me not to know anything else because I’m
immensely pre-occupied with my own task, with my own statement, with my own
exhibits, which I had to study, and what would have been said else by another
person it was entirely irrelevant for me.
MR TANSEY: Number 6 was the number given to you by somebody and you are not
telling us the truth.
MR GORDIEVSKY: It’s not true.
____________